

# Lessons Learned from the TIGER Discretionary Grant Program



Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery



April 2013

# Acknowledgements

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Amy Cavaretta  
2012 Thomas J. O'Bryant Fellow  
Eno Center for Transportation

## About Eno

The Eno Center for Transportation is a neutral, non-partisan think-tank that promotes policy innovation and leads professional development in the transportation industry. As part of its mission, Eno seeks continuous improvement in transportation and its public and private leadership in order to increase the system's mobility, safety and sustainability.

The leader in its field for nearly a century, Eno provides government and industry leaders with timely research and a neutral voice on policy issues. Eno's Center for Transportation Policy (CTP) publishes rigorous, objective analyses on the problems facing transportation and provides ideas for and a clear path toward possible solutions. CTP also publishes a monthly transportation newsletter that reaches 2,500 individuals directly plus another 40,000 through the Transportation Research Board. CTP's policy forums bring together industry leaders to discuss pressing issues and hear from top researchers in the field.

Through its professional development programs, the Center for Transportation Leadership (CTL), Eno cultivates creative and visionary leadership by giving public and private transportation leaders the tools and training the need to succeed together. CTL's leadership Development Conference brings the nation's top transportation students to Washington, DC, each year to meet with top practitioners in the field, while other CTL programs give transportation executives the tools they need to be successful as leaders. Since its inception, CTL has instructed over 3,500 transportation professionals.

Eno was founded in 1921 by Williams Phelps Eno (1859-1945), who pioneered the field of traffic management in the United States and Europe. Mr. Eno sought the promote safe mobility by ensuring that traffic control became an accepted role of government and traffic engineering a recognized professional discipline. His "Rules of the Road", adopted by the City of New York in 1909, became the world's first city traffic plan. He also wrote the first-ever manual of police traffic regulations. In 1921 he chartered and endowed the Eno Center for Transportation to attract the thinking of other transportation experts and specialist, and to provide a forum for unbiased discussions that would lead to improvements in the movement of people and goods.

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# Introduction

Recent years have seen a strong shift in emphasis toward a more performance-based federal transportation policy in Washington, DC. Performance-based competitive grant programs could be an important component of this shift. A number of existing and recent federal discretionary grant programs, such as Transit New Starts or the Urban Partnership Agreement, already award transportation funding on a competitive basis. Under these programs, the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) selects projects for funding based on criteria and analysis. Recent papers by the Eno Center for Transportation and the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC)<sup>1</sup> call for Congress to include performance-based competitive grant programs in future federal surface transportation policy reforms based on research showing that such programs, if they are implemented effectively, “allow for a bottom-up approach in which states and local areas have the flexibility to develop proposals that reflect their preferred strategies for advancing national goals.”<sup>2</sup> These papers conclude that competitive grant programs can play an integral role in making federal transportation policy more performance based and accountable to national objectives.

An example is the Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) program, which was established as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (also known as the ARRA or “stimulus bill”) to fund transportation infrastructure projects using a mode-neutral, merit-based approach. For the first round of the TIGER program, USDOT had authority and discretion to distribute \$1.5 billion general fund dollars in fiscal year (FY) 2009 to transportation projects around the country. Congress went on to reauthorize the program three additional

times. As of August 2012, the TIGER program funded grants to a total of 186 transportation projects, supplying \$3.1 billion in federal dollars and leveraging a total transportation infrastructure investment of \$17.5 billion.<sup>3</sup> At the time of this writing, funding for a fifth round of TIGER is included in draft continuing resolutions in both the House and the Senate, making it possible for the program to continue for at least one more year.

Among the few discretionary grant programs managed by USDOT, TIGER was designed with some unique features. It was the first major federal transportation grant program to be mode-neutral, meaning that any surface transportation project, regardless of mode could apply for funding. It was one of only a handful of federal transportation programs that used economic analysis—specifically benefit-cost analysis—as part of the application evaluation process. And while most federal transportation funding can be accessed only by state DOTs or transit agencies, the TIGER application process was open to any project sponsor.

TIGER was, at its roots, part of a larger stimulus program designed, in part, to promote economic recovery in the short term. But the program outlived the ARRA and was reauthorized three additional times, as part of a general appropriations bill, with bipartisan support. This paper examines the history and performance of the TIGER program over the period from 2009 to 2012 with a focus on identifying specific program features that are particularly relevant for broader efforts to make U.S. transportation policy more performance based.



The reconstruction of Pier 20 in Honolulu Harbor was included in TIGER I and received \$24.5 million in funding.

# Methodology

This review of the TIGER program relies on information from a number of sources, including current literature on TIGER and other discretionary grant programs, project funding data from USDOT, and discussions with former and current congressional staff, USDOT officials, TIGER program applicants, and members of the transportation research and academic community. The analysis is divided into three primary sections:

## **TIGER Program Creation and Structure**

This section examines the context and circumstances surrounding the program's creation and reviews the legislative provisions that provided the basis for its operating structure.

## **Program Execution**

This section provides quantitative and qualitative analyses of the program's implementation and management history, including a record of TIGER program decisions and funding distribution by region, mode, state, project type, and financial leverage.

## **Discussion and Policy Recommendations**

The last part of this paper summarizes insights and lessons learned from the TIGER program and develops policy recommendations concerning the design of future discretionary grant programs and their place in the larger federal surface transportation program.

Freight trains in and out of Chicago were part of the CREATE program, which was included in both TIGER I (\$100 million) and TIGER IV (\$10.4 million).



# Political Creation and Program Structure

## Legislative Process

A review of the TIGER program's creation, and of the legislative process behind it, helps to illuminate the rationale for certain program features. In the case of TIGER, several influential actors within Congress shaped the program's structure, related legislative provisions, and its execution by USDOT.

For many years, mayors, state governors, and members of Congress had been calling for a multi-modal discretionary grant program at the federal level. In 2008 the Senate Appropriations Committee began to explore the idea of expanding USDOT's discretionary funding in light of the expectation that federal stimulus legislation would be adopted in early 2009. Senator Patty Murray (D-Wash.), with the assistance of Peter Rogoff, then a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee staff and later the Administrator for the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), is largely credited with introducing the concept of a multi-modal discretionary grant program as part of the ARRA.<sup>4</sup> Senator Murray, among others, saw the lack of funding for multi-modal transportation projects of national and regional importance as an issue that could be partially addressed

through the stimulus bill and, with Mr. Rogoff's help, began building support for this approach within the Senate. The Appropriations Committee ultimately decided to make some ARRA funding available for the proposed multi-modal discretionary program.<sup>5</sup> Initial Senate drafts of the authorizing legislation included provisions for extensive modal eligibility within surface transportation projects nationwide, providing the foundation for a wide range of potential grantees and broad political support.

Around the same time, members of the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee (T&I), led by Congressman Jim Oberstar (D-Minn.), were developing their own "wish-list" for transportation provisions in upcoming stimulus legislation. In contrast to the Senate, several T&I members believed if the stimulus package appropriated too much discretionary funding to transportation, it could reduce the sums available for traditional funding in the upcoming federal surface transportation reauthorization bill. Based on this assumption, a majority of T&I members argued that minimal funding be made available through the proposed multi-modal discretionary program.<sup>6</sup>

While the concept of a multi-modal discretionary program had the support of Democratic majorities in the House and Senate—and of the Obama Administration—a majority of Republican members in both houses of Congress expressed concern on several grounds. First, they argued that delegating grant-making power to the USDOT could relinquish too much control to the president’s Transportation Secretary. In addition, several Republicans objected to the appropriation of additional federal funds to specific transportation projects, given their view that funding should be distributed to states via formulas so that states could choose projects independently.<sup>7</sup>

Ultimately, language was incorporated into the ARRA that provided \$1.5 billion in discretionary funding for a transportation grant program that was competitive, available to a broad range of possible grantees and project sizes, and was aimed at projects with national or regional significance.<sup>8</sup> Initial House and Senate drafts of the relevant legislative language were modified in the ARRA to ensure that the program would focus on advancing the national goals of economic recovery and job creation. Once these provisions were added to the ARRA and “adopted” by the Administration, support for the new grant program—which was now linked to the policy direction and priorities of a Democratic administration—took a more decidedly partisan tone. The ARRA ultimately passed, but no House Republicans and only two Senate Republicans supported the bill in the final vote.<sup>9</sup>

While the TIGER program represented only a small portion of the larger ARRA stimulus package, it drew substantial criticism from lawmakers, particularly on the Republican side, who referred to the program as “executive earmarking.”<sup>10</sup> Despite this criticism, however, Congress continued the program in subsequent appropriations bills, authorizing \$600 million, \$528 million, and \$500 million to fund TIGER in fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively.

These appropriation bills, because they provide funding for many federal programs across a broad range of agencies, have generally passed with bipartisan support. But Republicans have continued to express their general dislike for the TIGER program and subsequent appropriations bills that include the program have generally received more Democratic votes than Republican votes.<sup>11</sup>

At the same time, other ARRA programs favored by Democrats, such as the High Speed Intercity Passenger Rail (HSIPR) program, were eliminated in later appropriations bills. This suggests that, despite its critics, TIGER was better able than some other programs at attracting bipartisan support. At this point in time, however, it appears as though

TIGER might not continue in its current form. The program was never part of larger surface transportation legislation and the recently passed highway bill, MAP-21 (Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century), did not authorize continued funding for TIGER grants.

## Program Structure

From the outset, the TIGER program included several features that were not typical of previous discretionary grant programs for transportation projects. Some of these features were subsequently modified when the program was continued in 2010, 2011, and 2012. Design elements in the legislative language were then reflected in USDOT’s administration of the program.

## Legislative Requirements

Key design features of the TIGER program that were stipulated in the text of the ARRA and in subsequent re-authorizing legislation are listed below and summarized in Table 1:<sup>12</sup>

- **Geographic Distribution.** The Secretary of Transportation was required to take “such measures so as to ensure an equitable geographic distribution of funds.” The authorizing legislation also capped the share of TIGER program funds that could be distributed to a given state. Between the second and fourth years of program implementation, this maximum increased from 20 percent to 25 percent.<sup>13</sup>
- **Federal Share of Project Funding.** USDOT was directed to give “priority” to projects that leveraged other funding. In the second year of the program the maximum federal share of project funding was reduced from 100 percent to 80 percent in an apparent effort to spur greater cost sharing and co-investment, though rural projects could still qualify for a federal share greater than 80 percent.<sup>14</sup>
- **Rural/Urban Distribution.** The ARRA directed USDOT to ensure “an appropriate balance in addressing the needs of urban and rural communities.” A provision added in the second year of the program (TIGER II) established a statutory requirement for minimum funding for rural projects. For TIGER II and III, USDOT was required to award a minimum of \$140 million in each round to projects in areas that were designated rural by the U.S. Census.<sup>15</sup> For TIGER IV, the funding minimum for rural areas was decreased to \$120 million, in line with a reduction in the overall program budget for FY2012.<sup>16</sup> The minimum grant size for a rural project was set by statute at \$1 million;<sup>17</sup> in addition, USDOT was allowed to increase the federal cost share above 80 percent for rural projects.<sup>18</sup>

Year	Appropriated Funding	Max Funding Per State	Minimum Rural Funding	Maximum TIGER Share of Project Costs
TIGER I-FY2009	\$1.5 billion	20%	None	100%
TIGER II-FY2010	\$600 million	25%	\$140 million	80%
TIGER III-FY2011	\$528 million	25%	\$140 million	80%
TIGER IV-FY2012	\$500 million	25%	\$120 million	80%

**Table 1:** TIGER Legislative Provisions by Year

### Program Elements Defined by USDOT

One of the most important differences between TIGER and traditional federal surface transportation programs was that USDOT had substantial control over program structure and operation, including project selection, evaluation, and monitoring. Aside from the specifics mentioned above, the program’s authorizing legislation gave USDOT broad discretion to distribute funds “on a competitive basis that will have a significant impact on the nation, a metropolitan area, or region.” The legislation also provided a broad definition of eligible types of surface transportation projects, with the caveat that listed modes should be understood to represent the minimum of potentially eligible projects, not the limit. Within these statutory guidelines, USDOT developed other key aspects of the program structure, including:

- **Modal Inclusion.** In addition to the modes specifically listed in the ARRA and subsequent legislation, USDOT encouraged potential grantees to submit applications for biking and walking projects, transportation projects from multiple modes, and projects that improved existing systems or connectivity.<sup>19</sup>
- **Broad Grantee Eligibility.** In all four rounds of the TIGER grant awards, agencies of any type or size—including state, regional, and local agencies; metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), port authorities, and multi-agency collaborations—were invited to submit applications for funding.<sup>20</sup> This expanded the pool of potential grantees beyond traditional entities such as

state DOTs or public transit authorities. In later rounds, prospective grantees were allowed to submit no more than three applications for TIGER funding.

- **Shovel-Ready.** Initial legislative statutes instructed USDOT to give priority to projects that could be completed within three years of enactment. Thus, early rounds of TIGER grant-making emphasized “shovel ready” projects that were in a position to begin construction immediately. While this program feature was subsequently dropped, “job creation and near term economic activity” remained a primary selection criterion in later rounds of TIGER project selection.<sup>21</sup>
- **Financial Leverage.** In accordance with the legislative requirements for cost sharing noted previously, USDOT gave priority to project applications that included substantial financial co-investment by another agency or source.<sup>22</sup>

Previous discretionary grant programs were typically part of multi-year authorization bills that set clear expectations for the role of individual modal administrations in project selection and grant management. In the case of TIGER, the role of Congress was mostly limited to appropriating the overall level of program funds and there was no clear delegation of responsibility for program implementation to a particular modal administration within USDOT.<sup>23</sup> USDOT therefore began implementing the program—subject to relevant statutory guidelines—within the Office of the Secretary (OST).

The New Orleans Streetcar-Union Passenger Terminal / Loyola Loop was part of TIGER I and funded at \$45 million.



## Program Execution

### The TIGER Task Force

Unlike many grant programs that are delegated to modal agencies, OST retained the primary responsibility for developing and executing the TIGER program. This included overseeing program organization, staffing, the grant application process, criteria development, grant selection processes, and grant monitoring. OST had not typically exercised this degree of direct program administration responsibility prior to TIGER.


Almost immediately, the scale of the challenge became evident, as the ARRA required USDOT to “publish criteria on which to base the competition... not later than 90 days after enactment.” The bill further stipulated that “applications for funding... be submitted not later than 180 days after the publication of such criteria.”<sup>24</sup>

Anticipating that the ARRA would include a new discretionary grant program, Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood assembled a team—known as the “TIGER Task Force”—to take charge of the program before the ARRA was signed into law in February 2009. The TIGER Task Force included officials from OST and the modal administrations; it was co-chaired by a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget and Programs and a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy within OST.<sup>25</sup>

### Application Process

The TIGER Task Force created methods for measuring, defining, and evaluating applications in a manner that would advance the program’s goals. USDOT subsequently released detailed application and project selection requirements for each round of funding in a Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) published through the *Federal Register*.<sup>26</sup> Applicants were required to provide a short narrative, describing the project and presenting design information and economic analysis. Applications were designed to be relatively brief so agencies could prioritize the projects they submitted for funding and ensure those applications fully met the requirements of the program.

TIGER grant applications were evaluated using “primary” and “secondary” selection criteria. The first primary selection criterion focused on five long-term outcomes: safety, economic competitiveness, state of good repair, livability, and environmental sustainability.<sup>27</sup> Once a project was determined to satisfy the criteria for long-term outcomes, it was evaluated using the second primary criterion of short-term economic stimulus. Specifically, the aim was to give “priority to projects that are expected to quickly create and preserve jobs and promote rapid increases in economic activity.”<sup>28</sup> Less weight was given to a number of secondary selection criteria, including innovation and partnership.



**Figure 1:** Project Evaluation Process

To evaluate long-term economic outcomes, the Task Force incorporated benefit-cost analysis (BCA) in the program application and evaluation process. Other discretionary USDOT programs, such as the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation (TIFIA) loan program and the Transit New Starts grant program, had also required economic analysis in their application and evaluation processes. But TIGER was the first discretionary federal transportation program that required project applicants to estimate total expected project benefits and weigh them against project costs.

While BCA can be a valuable tool for selecting projects, many applicants had little or no experience with this type of analysis and USDOT had little experience using it within discretionary grant programs. In the second year of the TIGER program and beyond, the TIGER Task Force provided detailed guidance on required BCA calculations; the Task Force also reached out to potential applicants with presentations, webinars, and “how-to” manuals on how to conduct BCAs.<sup>29</sup>

### Evaluation Process

As TIGER represented an unfamiliar approach to grant making, USDOT had to determine how to shape the program’s grant evaluation process so that it would be consistent with the specific provisions of the authorizing legislation and with principles of “good governance” more

broadly. The Task Force ultimately developed a team-based project evaluation process that included Modal Evaluation Teams, an Economic Evaluation Team, an Environmental Evaluation Team, a Senior Review Team, and a Control & Calibration Team.<sup>30</sup> The teams participated in a five-stage evaluation process, outlined in Figure 1 above and described below.

In Stage One of the evaluation process, similar types of projects were assigned to one of four Modal Evaluation Teams: freight, highway, transit, or multi-modal. The relevant modal evaluation team discussed and formulated evaluation narratives for each project application and assigned a qualitative rating (i.e., not recommended, recommended, highly recommended). Projects were cross-checked between the Modal Evaluation Teams, and combined into four final lists of “highly recommended” projects within each mode. Projects that were “highly recommended” advanced to the next stage.<sup>31</sup>

In Stage Two of the evaluation process, the Economic Analysis Team completed a review of the BCA submitted with each project application and, if necessary, re-calculated benefit-cost values. At this stage, each BCA was evaluated for overall quality, reliability and usefulness as well as whether the overall result showed project benefits exceeding project costs. The Environmental Review Team looked at

several additional issues, including construction readiness, as indicated by Project Development & Engineering (PD&E) studies; compatibility with environmental regulation; and anticipated political or environmental challenges. Based on its findings in these areas, the Environmental Review Team then calculated an environmental risk rating for the project.<sup>32</sup>

In Stage Three of the evaluation process, highly recommended projects were presented to the Senior Review Team by each of the Modal Evaluation Team leaders. Brief presentations were made for each project, aimed at providing an overview of project details, degree of alignment with TIGER program goals, and potential challenges.

In Stage Four, the Control and Calibration Team—which oversaw and monitored each step of the entire review process to ensure consistency and fairness in project evaluation<sup>33</sup>—worked with the Senior Review Team to narrow highly recommended projects down to an unofficial grantee list of between 50 and 60 projects. At this point, some unofficial project grantees were contacted to negotiate specific funding amounts and ensure that financial co-investment levels could be met. After finalizing the list of grantees and funding amounts for each project, OST made final funding decisions and confirmed with grantees. Applicants who did not receive funding were not contacted; these applicants could, however, receive general feedback on their application by directly contacting USDOT.<sup>34</sup>

Stage Five of the process followed after project selection. At this point responsibility for monitoring and overseeing work on TIGER-funded projects was assigned to specific administrations within USDOT—that is, to either the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), or the Maritime Administration (MARAD)—according to the dominant mode of transportation affected by the project. Each grantee was required to develop a project-specific performance plan with its appropriate modal administration, to “track and report on the effectiveness of each investment in achieving the benefits promised in the application.”<sup>35</sup> OST continued to provide programmatic oversight and monitoring.

Overall, the TIGER evaluation and selection process was designed to select the best projects from the point of view of the Administration, based on an ostensibly mode-neutral and location-neutral approach, within the broad program guidelines set forth in authorizing legislation. The TIGER NOFA and other DOT publications do not indicate how the project selection process incorporated other legislative guidelines, such as requirements for geographic diversity or urban/rural balance in the distribution of TIGER grants.

## Use of TIGER Funds

This section examines program outcomes using public data (available from USDOT’s website) about which projects received TIGER funds and how these funds were used. The information available for each funded project covers the project’s mode, description, location, and funding amounts. A complete list of projects can be found in the appendix. This analysis uses classifications already established by USDOT for mode and region.<sup>36</sup> While it does not focus on individual projects, the analysis is intended to provide insights as to how USDOT followed both legislative and internal procedures to distribute TIGER funding. These results and their implications for the design of future federal discretionary grant programs are discussed in a later section of this paper.

## Appropriated Funding and Applications


Each round of the TIGER program was highly competitive and attracted a substantial number of applications. In the first round, applications totaled almost \$60 billion in requested funding, well over the available program budget of \$1.5 billion.<sup>37</sup> Out of 1,400 applications, only 51 projects in 42 states were selected for funding in the first round of TIGER grants.<sup>38</sup>

In the second round, Congress more than halved the program’s budget to \$600 million, and 42 projects in 29 states were selected out of 1,000 applications. It should be noted that \$35 million was diverted from TIGER II to fund a joint program with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) called “Partnership for Sustainable Communities.” This \$35 million went to assist in funding planning for 33 transportation and transportation-related projects. As these grants did not go to capital projects, they are not included in the project analysis in this paper.


In the third and fourth years of the program, the TIGER budget was further reduced to \$528 million and \$500 million, respectively. The number of applications also declined: to 828 applications in FY2011 and 703 applications in FY2012—close to half the number of applications received for TIGER’s first round of funding in FY2009. Smaller numbers of applications reflected the decline in program funding as well as the low funding rates for initial TIGER applicants. Additionally, starting with TIGER II, USDOT began limiting the number of applications that could be submitted by a single agency to three so as to discourage some agencies from submitting a large volume of proposals.

## Geographic Distribution


Several provisions regarding the geographic distribution of TIGER funds were included in the program’s authorizing




**Figure 2:** Total TIGER Funding by Year (in millions)



**Figure 3:** Total TIGER Applications by Year



**Figure 4:** Total TIGER Projects by Year



**Figure 5:** States Awarded TIGER Grants by Year

legislation. Most notably, USDOT was to ensure an “equitable distribution of funds” and could not give more than 20 percent of annually appropriated funds to any one state in TIGER I (in the next three years of the program, this limit was increased to 25 percent).<sup>39</sup>

While most federal surface transportation grants are distributed to states by legislated formulas, large shares of TIGER funding could theoretically have gone to particular states or regions. In reality, the program awarded funds to projects in all 50 states over the four years it was implemented. Within each year, the number of states receiving TIGER grants

varied, from a high of 42 states in TIGER I and a low of 29 states in TIGER II.

Looking at all four years of program implementation combined, Table 2 shows that the total number of grants made, the total amount of funding awarded, and the average size of each award was relatively even across different regions of the country. While the average grant amount awarded per project was similar across all regions, the size of individual project grants ranged from a low of \$1 million to a high of \$105 million.


Region	Sum of Total TIGER Funding	TIGER Projects	Average Value Per Project
Central	\$733.0 million	47	\$15.6 million
South	\$831.3 million	42	\$19.8 million
West	\$794.2 million	47	\$16.9 million
Northeast	\$692.8 million	50	\$13.9 million

**Table 2:** TIGER Projects and Funding by Region

Figures 6 and 7 show the states that received the highest levels of TIGER funding. A few states in particular—California, Illinois, New York, Washington, and Texas—ranked as the top five for grants awarded in all four rounds of program funding. Given that these are also among the largest and most populous states in the country, this outcome seems broadly consistent with the stated aims of the program and the criteria used in project selection.

Figure 8 accounts for the population of each state and


shows TIGER funding over four years on a per-capita basis. Across all states and all four years of program implementation, TIGER funding amounted to an average of just under \$10 per person. On a per capita basis, many of the larger states received levels of funding close to this average. Smaller grants can have a dramatic impact on small states, such as North Dakota which received three grants totaling only \$28 million. One outlier is the state of Washington, which received the fourth largest share of TIGER funding despite ranking 13<sup>th</sup> in population.



**Figure 6:** Overall TIGER Funding (in millions), Top 10 States



**Figure 7:** Overall Number of TIGER Projects, Top 10 States



**Figure 8:** Overall Amount of TIGER Funding per Capita

### Rural/Urban Distribution

A persistent issue in transportation funding is the dynamic between rural and urban areas. Since more people live in urban areas, transportation improvements within an urban area often benefit larger numbers of people. For this reason, benefit–cost analyses tend to favor projects in urban areas. Beginning with TIGER II, USDOT was required by statute to ensure that a minimum amount of TIGER funding went to rural projects, as shown in Table 3. Note that the \$35

million for Partnerships for Sustainable Communities planning grants are not included in the TIGER II data. Overall, the amount of TIGER funding allocated to rural projects exceeded the statutory minimum by about 2 percent in each year of program implementation. Grant amounts for projects in rural areas averaged around \$7.4 million; in urban areas, the average grant size was almost double that—\$14.4 million.

Year	Legislative Minimum Requirements for Rural Projects	Rural Funding
TIGER I	<b>No distinction</b>	
TIGER II	\$140 million (23%)	\$137 million (25%)
TIGER III	\$140 million (27%)	\$150 million (28%)
TIGER IV	\$120 million (24%)	\$128 million (26%)

**Table 3:** Rural Project Requirement and Funding


### Modal Distribution

While the ARRA required USDOT to award TIGER funds in a manner that was geographically dispersed and balanced between rural and urban areas, it provided no guidance concerning the percentage of funding to be awarded by transportation mode. Table 4 and Figures 9 and 10 show the


distribution of project funding by mode for each round of TIGER awards. Transit projects received the highest average TIGER funding (\$20.2 million/project) while biking/walking projects received the lowest average funding (\$10.9 million/project).

Mode	TIGER Funding	TIGER Projects
Road/Bridge	\$806.3 million	58
Freight/Ports/Rail	\$977.0 million	56
Transit	\$736.5 million	36
Biking/Walking	\$142.3	13
Multi-modal (involving more than one mode)	\$389.4 million	23

**Table 4:** TIGER Projects and Funding by Mode



**Figure 9:** TIGER Funding by Mode (\$ millions)



**Figure 10:** Number of TIGER Projects by Mode

## Federal Cost-Share

TIGER gave priority to project applications that included substantial co-investment by a state, regional, or local agency. In the first year of the program, TIGER funds could be used to cover 100 percent of project costs, but in subsequent rounds, the maximum federal cost-share was reduced by statute to 80 percent. In most cases, however, the federal cost-share was much lower: of the projects that success-

fully applied to the program, most used TIGER funding to cover a significantly smaller portion of overall project costs (Figures 11 and 12).<sup>40</sup> By mode, the federal contribution was highest, on average, for freight projects (56 percent) with road and bridge projects averaging the lowest federal cost-share (38 percent).




Figure 11: Average TIGER Funding Share by Mode




Figure 12: Average TIGER Funding Share by Region



Upgrades to Oklahoma freight rail were included in TIGER III and granted \$9.8 million in funding.

## Discussion

Earlier sections of this paper described the design and implementation of the TIGER program. This section reflects on the experience with the program in an effort to identify specific features that should be replicated or avoided in future discretionary federal transportation programs.

### Legislative Process and Program Structure

While TIGER has retained sufficient support in Congress to continue being funded, it has also attracted substantial opposition and criticism. Some have claimed that the program merely serves as a guise for “executive earmarks,” with funding decisions being made at USDOT instead of by Congress or at the state or local level.<sup>41</sup> A research paper from the Reason Foundation has called the program an “abysmal failure” and studies conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the USDOT Office of Inspector General (OIG) have cited a lack of accountability and transparency in the program’s decision-making, selection, and oversight processes.<sup>42</sup>

At a minimum, the TIGER program managed to survive at least three additional years beyond its origins in the ARRA. It has also outlasted other, more controversial stimulus-based transportation programs such as the High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail (HSIPR) grants. While the appropriation bills that included TIGER funding also included many

other programs across a broad range of agencies, elements of the TIGER program have consistently attracted bipartisan political support. Had it been less appealing to either party or been less broadly distributed, it would likely not have been included in these appropriation bills.

Traditional transportation grants come directly through the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) and are authorized through a multi-year transportation bill such as the recently passed MAP-21 legislation. As a transportation program, TIGER represented an exception to this rule since its funding came exclusively through the general fund and was authorized through the ARRA and subsequent appropriations bills. The fact that it was not funded through the HTF, in some respects, gave TIGER more operational flexibility. Since the HTF is funded primarily through gasoline and diesel fuel taxes, the implementation of broad transportation programs is often burdened by battles over the equitable distribution of HTF resources to particular states and modes. Because the TIGER program had no geographical or modal ties to user-based taxes, USDOT was able to use program resources to fund “non-traditional” forms of transportation infrastructure (such as walking, biking, port, freight rail, and intercity rail) without engaging in contentious user pay debates.



Priority Bus Transit in the Capital Region (Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, DC) was included in TIGER I and funded with \$58 million.

On the other hand, because it was never part of the HTF and the main federal transportation funding bill, the TIGER program could easily lose funding in future years, unlike other programs that have multi-year authorizing legislation supporting them.

In creating and sustaining the TIGER program, Congress relinquished an unusual degree of funding control to an executive agency. This is not typical of federal transportation programs, where the vast majority of funding is distributed via legislative formula to states. In fact, until the recent ban on earmarks, most “discretionary” transportation funding was distributed through congressional earmarks—including both direct earmarks and fully earmarked programs that were originally intended to exercise executive discretion such as the Projects of National and Regional Significance (PNRS) program. Other long-standing discretionary grant programs, such as Transit New Starts, include a component of shared decision-making. Under New Starts, for example,

Congress appropriates the entire program based on the FTA’s recommendations because “Congress recognizes the rigor of the evaluation process and generally follows FTA’s funding recommendations.”<sup>43</sup> Because the TIGER program lacked a similar shared decision-making component, members of Congress could not take primary credit for directing TIGER funding to projects in their respective states or districts.

USDOT’s broad discretion over the distribution of TIGER funding seems to have helped the program sustain political support and continue for four years. The fact that TIGER grants were available to any agency, organization, or state helped build a much broader constituency of support relative to grant programs that are focused on a particular mode or available only to state DOTs. From a policy perspective, this was seen as a positive attribute since it ensured that states and localities had “the flexibility to develop proposals that reflect their preferred strategies for advancing national goals” outlined by the program.<sup>44</sup>

### Program Execution

With a broad mandate and substantial discretion over program design and funding decisions, USDOT took on the difficult task of implementing TIGER and developing an effective project selection process. For the most part, USDOT appears to have followed congressional guidelines with respect to issues like geographical distribution, modal eligibility, and rural/urban balance. A program that used a completely analytical process to award grants might, over decades, produce an even nation-wide distribution of funds, but the TIGER program came fairly close to achieving this result in its first four years. This suggests that USDOT included internal decision factors to ensure funds would be distributed somewhat evenly to states and regions throughout the country. USDOT also was able to award sufficient funding to rural projects to meet the legally required minimum for rural funding, even though—based on the posted NOFA—criteria to ensure that rural projects were selected were not included in the project selection process. The broad distribution of TIGER funds to 42 states in the first round of awards and the rural funding minimum that applied in subsequent years might have played a role in sustaining enough political support for the program to ensure subsequent appropriations.

Though the rural distribution requirement was potentially positive in terms of the TIGER program’s political sustainability, it could have diminished the program’s effectiveness with respect to funding the most worthy projects. From a benefit-cost standpoint, one might expect more urban projects to be selected due to the greater concentration of users for urban infrastructure. Given that USDOT barely met the rural funding minimum for TIGER grants, it ap-

pears likely the agency would have selected a greater proportion of urban projects had it not been for the rural funding requirement that was applied to TIGER II and subsequent program rounds. On the other hand, the rural funding requirement also ensured that rural transportation networks were not neglected and gave lawmakers from rural districts a reason to support the program.

The fact that the TIGER program's authorizing legislation gave primary selection authority to USDOT officials, while providing only limited statutory criteria or direction to guide program execution for a large amount of funding, later fueled a cynical view of the program by some members of Congress. Despite USDOT's efforts to establish a merit-based and objective process for awarding TIGER grants, several members of Congress voiced concern that "decisions were made behind closed doors"—thus implying that politics or special interests may have played into the decision-making process.<sup>45</sup> A prominent criticism was that USDOT was giving preference to projects in Illinois, home to both President Obama and Secretary LaHood. Illinois did get a substantial amount of TIGER funding, but on a per capita basis the state was nearly average. In fact it could be argued that Illinois should have received an even higher proportion of TIGER funding, from a national impact perspective, given Chicago's central role in nationwide passenger and freight transportation networks. A more telling observation might be that Washington state, which received a disproportionately large amount of TIGER funding relative to the size of its population, is also home to Senator Patty Murray, one of the key players in the creation of the TIGER program.

It is apparent that some of the Obama Administration's priorities were strongly reflected in the selection criteria. "Livability" and "environmental sustainability" were two of the TIGER program's five goals, and their inclusion explains the granting of funds to multiple bicycle and pedestrian projects. That is not to say that these projects should not have been considered under a multi-modal program, but simply that USDOT made a point of attempting to deliver on those particular policy goals, which were not necessarily shared by all members of Congress. Some may disagree with specific selections but overall the program did direct funding to a broad range of projects that undoubtedly were in the national interest. While it was outside of the scope of this paper to evaluate TIGER on a per-project basis, a listing of TIGER projects and other relevant information can be found in the appendix.

A critical component of the TIGER program was USDOT's decision to take an aggressive approach to analyzing long-term economic impact, thereby providing a unique opportunity to apply the tools of BCA to transportation funding



The West Basin Railyard at the Port of Los Angeles received \$16 million in funding as a TIGER II project.

decisions. Though not required to do so under the ARRA, the TIGER Task Force took responsibility for incorporating BCA into the TIGER project selection process and educating applicants about how to satisfy the BCA requirement. While many transportation experts and researchers have recommended that BCA be included in federal, state, and local decision-making, adding this element in practice proved challenging for USDOT as well as for prospective grantees. In the first round of TIGER grant applications, the number of incorrect or unusable BCA submissions led to extensive and "time-consuming" work by the Economic Analyses Team to bring the quality of all applicants' BCAs to the same level for evaluation purposes.<sup>46</sup> In response, the TIGER Task Force provided more detailed guidance on BCA calculations for subsequent rounds of grant applications and reached out to applicants through presentations, webinars, and "how-to" manuals for preparing cost-benefit analyses.<sup>47</sup>

The BCA component left many prospective TIGER grantees at a disadvantage. Some smaller agencies believed they were at a disadvantage relative to larger agencies because they lacked the resources to prepare comparably rigorous applications.<sup>48</sup> Even large agencies and organizations often lacked experience preparing detailed analyses of long-term project benefits. The methods available for conducting BCAs have been described as difficult to implement and somewhat unreliable in terms of assuring the best use of federal funding and investments of taxpayer dollars.<sup>49</sup>

USDOT did not use quantitative ranking systems beyond the BCA in project evaluations for the TIGER program, due to staff capacity and fiscal restraints.<sup>50</sup> Other methods used to evaluate project applications included qualitative descriptions, such as "highly recommended" or "not recommended." The Economic Analysis Team used BCA to verify that a proposed project's benefit-cost ratio was positive, but applications were not otherwise "ranked" according to the



Wyoming's Beartooth Highway Reconstruction Project was included in TIGER I and received \$6 million in funding.

calculated ratio.<sup>51</sup> This spawned criticism as observers and unsuccessful applicants sought to understand why some projects received funding while others did not.

Reliance on BCA as a condition for the TIGER application and evaluation process has, however, focused new attention on the way agencies and states around the country consider the economic impacts and value of transportation investments. Similar to the growing emphasis on economic analysis in transportation investments, state and local agencies are beginning to expand the use of mode-neutral evaluations for transportation funding decisions.<sup>52</sup> The benefit of including economic analysis in federal discretionary programs seems to go beyond better project selection for limited federal dollars; this practice also can encourage local and state agencies to better analyze their own projects. With limited available funding, policymakers at all levels of government are increasingly interested in ways to leverage public transportation dollars and prioritize funding for those projects that deliver the greatest benefits. TIGER was a good first step in this direction.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of the TIGER program was the emphasis on “shovel-ready” projects that could be completed within three years as stipulated in the original ARRA legislation. While this preference was phased out in subsequent appropriations, USDOT maintained short-term economic growth factors as a primary selection criterion. This approach might make sense in the context of legislation designed to accelerate an economic recovery, however job creation should not be the primary concern of transportation policies and programs more generally. At the same time, near-term economic considerations should not be excluded completely: between two competing projects with similar costs and benefits, perhaps the project that can be completed faster should get priority.

According to USDOT, accountability and transparency have been important goals throughout the design and implementation of the TIGER program, including the project selection process.<sup>53</sup> Two recent reports on the program, however, identified challenges in these areas. In 2011, the GAO conducted an evaluation aimed at giving Congress a “better basis to assess the merits” of the new program. A subsequent audit by the USDOT’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) examined and assessed OST’s oversight of TIGER projects.<sup>54</sup>

The GAO report reviewed and evaluated several aspects of the TIGER program, particularly as they related to concerns about transparency and accountability in USDOT’s decision-making. Based on its review, the GAO recommended that USDOT further “document decisions in their review of applications,” and “develop and implement a strategy to disclose information about their decisions.”<sup>55</sup> At the same time, the GAO report acknowledged that USDOT is not required by law to disclose more information about its funding decisions, noting that while “Congress and the President have emphasized the need for accountability, efficiency, and transparency...the [Recovery] Act did not define the attributes of transparency or how deep into the deliberative process an agency’s actions should be transparent.”<sup>56</sup>

Recognizing that USDOT was in the difficult position of launching TIGER and related policies under tight ARRA deadlines, the OIG audit generally confirmed the adherence to proper practices in grant management. However, it also pointed to some problems with several program oversight elements.<sup>57</sup> As detailed in the September 2012 audit report, these shortcomings include OST’s lack of formal processes to document and monitor oversight by the modal administrations, the failure to include project performance measures within grant agreements, a lack of overall expenditure targets, a lack of program risk assessments, and a lack of formal processes for finalizing grant agreements.<sup>58</sup> In addition to vulnerabilities within, the OIG audit also cites limitations in the four modal administrations’ oversight of TIGER grants and differences in oversight capacities and operations from one modal administration to another. In response, OST stated that Congress requested a lean program and “afforded the TIGER program only 1/10<sup>th</sup> of 1 percent of overall program funding for conducting oversight.”<sup>59</sup> OST stated that appropriate steps had been taken to account for most of the recommendations and requested that OIG’s outstanding issues be closed.

Some of these challenges stem from the organizational structure of the USDOT itself, which is organized into multiple mode-based administrations, each with its own methods for distributing funds. Given that projects involving multiple modes were potentially eligible for TIGER funding,

OST was charged with implementing the program despite having little experience in grant making. By giving primary project oversight responsibility to the four modal administrations, OST inadvertently created several oversight gaps. The OIG report identified vulnerabilities in four separate areas, all of which relate to the themes of transparency and accountability highlighted in this paper. The creation of a specific office or unit within USDOT with experienced staff to evaluate projects of varying modes might have helped the oversight process and increased efficiencies.

Much of this criticism must be put in perspective: TIGER was launched near the start of the Obama Administration and involved many decision makers who were relatively inexperienced in the administration of federal grants.<sup>60</sup> Thus the learning curve was steep and there was exceptional pressure to expedite program delivery to meet very tight legislative deadlines without sacrificing accountability and transparency. Programs often take many years to develop and smooth out challenges. In only four years TIGER did not have much of a chance to fully develop.

The next sections summarize aspects of the TIGER program that offer important lessons for future discretionary programs.

### Characteristics of TIGER That Should Be Considered for Replication in Future Programs

- **Benefit–cost analysis.** As USDOT and other agencies gain experience, BCA will likely improve and become more helpful in informing decisions about the best use of scarce resources.
- **Broad modal eligibility.** Modal flexibility allows states and localities to address their transportation problems using whatever solutions and strategies they determine to be the best.
- **Cost-share requirements.** A preference for projects that leveraged substantial co-investment from other entities ensured that more projects got built and stretched the federal funds available through TIGER to a broader area.
- **Broad agency eligibility.** From a political perspective and a policy perspective, allowing a wide variety of transportation agencies to apply for grants made federal funding more accessible than in other programs.
- **Provisions to promote broad geographic and rural/urban distribution.** While it could be argued that these provisions kept some higher-return projects from receiving TIGER grants, ensuring a somewhat even distribution of funds is essential to sustaining Congressional and public support.



The Kansas City Transit Corridors and Green Impact Zone project was included in TIGER I and received \$62.4 million in funding.

### Characteristics of TIGER That Should Be Avoided in Future Programs

- **Preference for “shovel ready” projects.** An emphasis on shovel ready projects made sense in the context of the original stimulus bill, but this feature of the TIGER program would be unhelpful for discretionary grant programs where the aim is to maximize investments over the long term.
- **Lack of congressional interaction.** Without any role in the project selection process, members of Congress could not take credit for projects in their districts and were more likely to dispute USDOT’s grant decisions. The approach taken with the Transit New Starts program, in which Congress approves DOT recommendations, could create the political appetite for a larger, long-term program.
- **Lack of transparency.** Even though USDOT made significant efforts to assure transparency in the TIGER grant selection process, a lack of information about the process and the basis for final funding decisions gave skeptics fuel to criticize the program and the process. A more transparent approach would help defuse this criticism while also enabling USDOT to improve the selection process based on feedback and criticism.
- **Lack of experience.** Both USDOT and potential grantees had little experience with the type of project evaluation and selection used in the TIGER program. Continuing a similar program with dedicated staff experienced in working on a multi-modal basis would generally help USDOT navigate many of the challenges encountered with TIGER.

Projects such as the Razorback Regional Bike/Pedestrian Greenway received \$15 million in funding from TIGER II.



## Policy Recommendations

This section describes policy recommendations drawn from the authors' analysis of the TIGER program as well as previous work done by the Eno Center for Transportation and the Bipartisan Policy Center. Central to these recommendations is the proposition, based largely on previous research, that federal transportation programs should include competitive discretionary grant programs that are sizeable, sustainable, and effective.<sup>61</sup> The following recommendations are intended to move the U.S. government further towards that goal.

### **Discretionary Grant Programs Need to Include an Active Role for Congress**

To promote political support and accountability, future discretionary grant programs should be structured to include a greater measure of cooperation between USDOT and Congress on project evaluation and selection. When Congress relinquished the TIGER program's grant making control entirely to USDOT it made the program more of a potential target for its own membership. A better strategy might be for USDOT to evaluate projects and make funding recommendations, and then have Congress confirm these recommendations (this is the process used in the New Starts program). This structure would help bring a substantial level of technical analysis to congressional decision-making.

Because it maintains congressional involvement throughout the project selection process, it is likely the only way that a sizeable discretionary grant program can be sustained in the long run.

### **Transparency and Accountability Are Essential for Discretionary Programs to be Sustainable**

To promote decision-making based on true merit in achieving program goals, Congress will need to be specific in authorizing legislation about how much information USDOT must disclose about its decision-making process to Congress and the public. At first, such disclosure requirements will result in increased scrutiny, but over time greater transparency will help produce a program that is widely viewed as fair and accountable. No agency can get the process right the first time, which is why transparency and public debate is necessary. An iterative learning process over time is more likely to result in a discretionary grant program that targets resources effectively. Congress can also help this process along by being as specific as possible about the criteria to be included in the project evaluation and grant selection process.

### **USDOT Needs a Dedicated Office to Handle Multi-modal Discretionary Grant Programs**

If and when Congress makes funding available, USDOT



The extension of the Dallas Area Rapid Transit's (DART) orange line received \$5 million as a TIGER III project.

should consider creating an office or branch that includes staff best equipped to administer, evaluate, and select projects for multi-modal discretionary programs. This office could draw on expertise from the modal administrations and would be better prepared to handle the challenges that multi-modal programs bring. While it is outside the scope of this paper to provide detailed recommendations concerning the structure and workings of such an office, this concept deserves serious consideration if major discretionary grant programs similar to TIGER are created in the future. Relying on OST to make technical decisions creates a political perception problem that is likely to exacerbate congressional sensitivities.

### **The Leveraging Intentions and Capability of Programs Like TIGER Need to be Communicated More Explicitly**

One of the primary goals of the TIGER program was to leverage federal transportation funds in ways that would maximize economic impact, job creation and economic recovery, but the program initially allowed for the federal share of project funding to cover as much as 100 percent of project costs. While leveraging occurred even in the first round of TIGER awards, it could potentially have been much greater had Congress been more explicit about this goal. To promote cost sharing, future discretionary grant programs

should clearly state their goals and requirements for leveraging and co-investment, not only in authorizing legislation but also throughout the process of program creation, oversight, and decision-making. Most TIGER grants covered less than 50 percent of project costs even with funding permitted for up to 100 percent, so it is likely that a more explicit emphasis on cost sharing could bring even more state, local and private funding to the table.

### **Funding Programs Should Be Transparent About the Costs of Including Set-Asides or Minimum Allocations**

The TIGER program included several set-asides and minimum allocations that were seen as necessary to win political support from various states and districts. These kinds of provisions impose actual costs – namely, they give the implementing agency less flexibility to select the most effective projects on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. Legislative provisions that constrain program outcomes in terms of geographic distribution, rural set-asides, or state funding limits should also require the implementing agency to clarify how these provisions affect project selection. While there may be a political need for such provisions, greater transparency about the tradeoffs inherent in set-asides or minimum allocations could help highlight their costs and deter future policymakers from abusing them.



Improvements to intermodal rail at the Port of Oakland received \$15 million and were a part of TIGER IV.

## Conclusions

With the current surface transportation bill, MAP-21—due to expire in the fall of 2014—Congress should consider new, competitive programs for investing limited federal transportation dollars. A recent report by the Bipartisan Policy Center, *Performance Driven: A New Vision for U.S. Transportation Policy*, suggested that Congress allocate 25 percent of all federal transportation funding to competitive grant programs for nationally important infrastructure improvements.

Action on this recommendation seems unlikely in the current political atmosphere, but it remains a worthy goal. TIGER represents a valuable case study for future discretionary grant programs if Congress chooses to move in this direction.

Federal transportation policy is in a period of transition. Increasingly, federal funding for surface transportation investments is being drawn from general fund revenues instead of dedicated fuel taxes. Transportation planners are expanding the use of multi-modal solutions rather than focusing on a single transport mode. With limited available funding, policymakers are interested in ways to leverage federal dollars and target funding to the most valuable projects. The future of federal surface transportation programs will likely be shaped by these trends, and future policy will need to be responsive to them. Multi-modal discretionary programs represent an opportunity to reinvigorate the federal government's role in an effective, performance-based manner. Policy-makers wishing to move in this direction can find several valuable lessons in the TIGER program.

# End Notes

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- <sup>13</sup> Consolidated Appropriations Act – H.R. 3288, Division A: Title I. (December 2009). Retrieved from: [www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ117/pdf/PLAW-111publ117](http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ117/pdf/PLAW-111publ117). “...that not more than 25 percent of the funds made available under this heading may be awarded to projects in a single State...”
- <sup>14</sup> Recovery Act, Division A: Title XII. (January 2009). Retrieved on June 13, 2012 from: [www.gpo.gov](http://www.gpo.gov). “...the Federal share of the costs for which an expenditure is made under this heading shall be...up to 80 percent...”
- <sup>15</sup> *ibid* “...that not less than \$140,000,000 of the funds provided under this heading shall be for projects located in rural areas...”
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- <sup>17</sup> *ibid* “...for projects in rural areas, the minimum grant size shall be \$1,000,000 and the Secretary may increase the Federal share of costs above 80 percent...”
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- <sup>26</sup> USDOT. (2012). Notice of Funding Availability for the Department of Transportation’s National Infrastructure Investments Under the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations, 2012. *Federal Register*. Retrieved June 29, 2012 at: [www.gpo.gov](http://www.gpo.gov).
- <sup>27</sup> *ibid*; These criteria were used in TIGER II – TIGER IV. TIGER I criteria were less detailed as less time was given to prepare the criteria.
- <sup>28</sup> *ibid*

- <sup>29</sup> USDOT. BCA Resource Guide. Retrieved June 20, 2012 at: [www.dot.gov](http://www.dot.gov).
- <sup>30</sup> Information based on personal correspondence with Jack Wells, USDOT, July 13, 2012.
- <sup>31</sup> *ibid*
- <sup>32</sup> *ibid*
- <sup>33</sup> *ibid*
- <sup>34</sup> *ibid*
- <sup>35</sup> USDOT. TIGER Grant Fact Sheet: Driven by Performance. Retrieved on June 25, 2012 at: [www.dot.gov](http://www.dot.gov).
- <sup>36</sup> USDOT. TIGER Grants: Related Documents. Retrieved as excel document on June 25, 2012 at: [www.dot.gov/tiger](http://www.dot.gov/tiger).
- Note: The U.S. Territory region covers the one TIGER grant given to Puerto Rico during TIGER II. This grant was relatively small (\$10 million) and was moved to the South region for analysis simplicity. Some projects had mislabeled modal categories and were corrected for the analysis. FY2011 TIGER (TIGER III) data used an alternate form of modal labeling. This was changed to match the labeling in TIGER I.
- <sup>37</sup> Federal Highway Administration. TIGER Discretionary Grants. USDOT. Retrieved on June 25, 2012 at: [www.ops.fhwa.gov/freight/intrastructure/tiger/index/htm](http://www.ops.fhwa.gov/freight/intrastructure/tiger/index/htm).
- <sup>38</sup> Reason Foundation. (April 2012). Evaluating and Improving TIGER Grants. p. 7.
- <sup>39</sup> Recovery Act, Division A: Title XII. (January 2009). Retrieved on June 27, 2012 from: [www.gpo.gov](http://www.gpo.gov). "...the Secretary shall take such measures to so as to ensure an equitable geographic distribution of funds..."
- <sup>40</sup> *ibid* "the Federal share of the costs for which an expenditure is made under this heading may be up to 100 percent..."
- <sup>41</sup> Orski, Ken. (January 2011). What Lies Ahead for Transportation in the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress? Retrieved on July 9, 2012 at: [www.innobriefs.com](http://www.innobriefs.com).
- <sup>42</sup> Feigenbaum, Baruch. Reason Foundation. (April 2012). Evaluating and Improving TIGER Grants; GAO. (March 2011). Report 11-234. Competitive Grant Programs Could Benefit from Increased Performance Focus and Better Documentation of Key Decisions. p. 29.
- U.S. DOT Office of Inspector General. (September 2012). Report MH-2012-188. p. 4-6. Retrieved on October 1, 2012 at: [www.oig.dot.gov](http://www.oig.dot.gov).
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- <sup>43</sup> Bipartisan Policy Center (January 25, 2010). New Starts: Lessons Learned for Discretionary Federal Transportation Funding Programs. Prepared by Parsons Brinkerhoff for the National Transportation Policy Project.
- <sup>44</sup> Bipartisan Policy Center (June 9, 2009). "Performance Driven: A New Vision for U.S. Transportation Policy." National Transportation Policy Project.
- <sup>45</sup> *Transportation Issues Daily*. (July 6, 2011). House Transportation Chair Mica Is No Fan of TIGER Program. Retrieved on July 9, 2012 at: [www.transportationissuesdaily.com/mica-is-no-fan-of-tiger-program/](http://www.transportationissuesdaily.com/mica-is-no-fan-of-tiger-program/).
- <sup>46</sup> Information based on personal correspondence with Jack Wells, USDOT, July 13, 2012.
- <sup>47</sup> USDOT. BCA Resource Guide. Retrieved on June 20, 2012 at: [www.dot.gov/tiger/docs/tiger-12\\_bca-resourceGuide.pdf](http://www.dot.gov/tiger/docs/tiger-12_bca-resourceGuide.pdf)
- <sup>48</sup> Information based on personal correspondence with Port of New Orleans, July 16, 2012.
- <sup>49</sup> *ibid*
- <sup>50</sup> Information based on personal correspondence with Jack Wells, USDOT, July 13, 2012.
- <sup>51</sup> *ibid*
- <sup>52</sup> Eno Center for Transportation (June 2012) "Better Use of Public Dollars: Economic Analysis in Transportation Decision Making."
- <sup>53</sup> USDOT. (May 2009). Agency-Wide Recovery Act Plan. p. 5. "...providing unprecedented transparency and accountability for all of its Recovery Act funding..."
- <sup>54</sup> USDOT Office of Inspector General. (September 2012). Report MH-2012-188. p. 4-6.
- GAO. (March 2011). Report 11-234. Competitive Grant Programs Could Benefit from Increased Performance Focus and Better Documentation of Key Decisions. p. 30.
- <sup>55</sup> GAO. (March 2011). Report 11-234. Competitive Grant Programs Could Benefit from Increased Performance Focus and Better Documentation of Key Decisions. p. 30.
- <sup>56</sup> *ibid* p. 26.
- <sup>57</sup> USDOT Office of Inspector General. (September 2012). Report MH-2012-188. p. 5.
- <sup>58</sup> *ibid*. p. 4-8.
- <sup>59</sup> *ibid*. p. 23.
- <sup>60</sup> Information based on personal correspondence with Susan Binder, Cambridge Systematics, January 23, 2013.
- <sup>61</sup> Bipartisan Policy Center (June 9, 2009) "Performance Driven: A New Vision for U.S. Transportation Policy. National Transportation Policy Project.

# Appendix: List of TIGER Projects

Project Name	Mode	State	Region	TIGER Funding	Total Project Cost	Rural/Urban
<b>TIGER I (FY 2009)</b>						
Crescent Corridor Intermodal Freight Rail Project	Freight	TN, AL	South	\$105,000,000	\$224,000,000	Unspecified
CREATE Program Rail Projects	Freight	IL	Central	\$100,000,000	\$162,000,000	Unspecified
National Gateway Freight Rail Corridor	Freight	OH, PA, WV, MD	Northeast	\$98,000,000	\$183,000,000	Unspecified
Moynihan Station, Phase 1	Multimodal	NY	Northeast	\$83,000,000	\$267,131,582	Unspecified
Tucson Modern Streetcar	Transit	AZ	West	\$63,000,000	\$150,100,000	Unspecified
Priority Bus Transit in the Capital Region	Transit	DC, VA, MD	Northeast	\$58,838,000	\$83,008,000	Unspecified
Fitchburg Commuter Rail Extension & Wachusett Station	Transit	MA	Northeast	\$55,500,000	\$72,200,000	Unspecified
Kansas City Transit Corridors & Green Impact Zone Project	Transit	MO, KS	Central	\$50,000,000	\$62,430,000	Unspecified
I-244 Multimodal Bridge Replacement	Multimodal	OK	South	\$49,480,000	\$86,720,000	Unspecified
Doyle Drive Replacement	Road/Bridge	CA	West	\$46,000,000	\$1,045,000,000	Unspecified
New Orleans Streetcar - Union Passenger Terminal/Loyola Loop	Transit	LA	South	\$45,000,000	\$45,000,000	Unspecified
Saint Paul Union Depot Multi-Modal Transit and Transportation Hub	Multimodal	MN	Central	\$35,000,000	\$237,500,000	Unspecified
US-395 North Spokane Corridor - Francis Ave. to Farwell Rd. Southbound	Road/Bridge	WA	West	\$35,000,000	\$35,000,000	Unspecified
Sahara Avenue Bus Rapid Transit	Transit	NV	West	\$34,400,000	\$45,156,000	Unspecified
Alameda Corridor East: Colton Crossing	Freight	CA	West	\$33,800,000	\$198,300,000	Unspecified
US-491 Safety Improvements	Road/Bridge	NM	West	\$31,000,000	\$147,000,000	Unspecified
California Green Trade Corridor/Marine Highway Project	Freight	CA	West	\$30,000,000	\$69,300,000	Unspecified
Black River Bridge Replacement	Road/Bridge	MI	Central	\$30,000,000	\$78,610,975	Unspecified
Mercer Corridor Redevelopment	Multimodal	WA	West	\$30,000,000	\$221,400,000	Unspecified
M1/Woodward Avenue Light Rail Project	Transit	MI	Central	\$25,000,000	\$143,000,000	Unspecified
Reconstruction of Pier 29 in Honolulu Harbor	Freight	HI	West	\$24,500,000	\$31,500,000	Unspecified
Portland's Innovation Quadrant - SW Moody St. & Streetcar Reconstruction	Transit	OR	West	\$23,203,988	\$66,532,551	Unspecified
Philadelphia Area Pedestrian & Bicycle Network	Bike/Ped	PA, NJ	Northeast	\$23,000,000	\$54,800,000	Unspecified
Downtown Dallas Streetcar	Transit	TX	South	\$23,000,000	\$58,000,000	Unspecified
Access to Quonset Wind Energy Project	Freight	RI	Northeast	\$22,300,000	\$36,490,000	Unspecified
Normal Multimodal Transportation Center	Multimodal	IL	Central	\$22,000,000	\$47,400,000	Unspecified
Park East Corridor Lift Bridges	Road/Bridge	WI	Central	\$21,500,000	\$29,200,000	Unspecified
Indianapolis Bicycle & Pedestrian Network	Bike/Ped	IN	Central	\$20,500,000	\$62,500,000	Unspecified
Otay Mesa Port-of-Entry I-805/SR-905 Interchange	Road/Bridge	CA	West	\$20,200,000	\$449,000,000	Unspecified
Milton-Madison Bridge Replacement	Road/Bridge	KY, IN	Central	\$20,000,000	\$131,000,000	Unspecified
Revere Transit Facility & Streetscape	Multimodal	MA	Northeast	\$20,000,000	\$122,585,262	Unspecified
Fast Track New Bedford	Freight	MA	Northeast	\$20,000,000	\$71,400,000	Unspecified

Project Name	Mode	State	Region	TIGER Funding	Total Project Cost	Rural/Urban
Port of Gulfport Rail Improvements	Freight	MS	South	\$20,000,000	\$50,000,000	Unspecified
Kent Central Gateway Multimodal Transit Facility	Multimodal	OH	Central	\$20,000,000	\$26,709,525	Unspecified
Texas State Highway 161	Road/Bridge	TX	South	\$20,000,000	\$1,300,000,000	Unspecified
Appalachian Regional Short Line Rail Project	Freight	KY, WV, TN	Central	\$17,551,028	\$21,938,786	Unspecified
Revitalizing Maine's Ports	Freight	ME	Northeast	\$14,000,000	\$14,000,000	Unspecified
Lake County Transportation Connectivity Project	Road/Bridge	MT	West	\$12,000,000	\$16,262,070	Unspecified
Bella Vista Bypass	Road/Bridge	AR, MO	South	\$10,000,000	\$358,100,000	Unspecified
US-36 Managed Lanes/Bus Rapid Transit	Transit	CO	West	\$10,000,000	\$160,000,000	Unspecified
I-85 Corridor Improvement and Yadkin River Crossing	Road/Bridge	NC	South	\$10,000,000	\$374,000,000	Unspecified
U.S. 17 Septima Clark Parkway	Road/Bridge	SC	South	\$10,000,000	\$146,300,000	Unspecified
I-95 Interchange & Access Project	Road/Bridge	SC	South	\$10,000,000	\$360,000,000	Unspecified
Improvements to US-18	Road/Bridge	SD	West	\$10,000,000	\$28,560,000	Unspecified
Ames Intermodal Facility	Multimodal	IA	Central	\$8,463,000	\$43,366,650	Unspecified
The Southwestern Illinois Intermodal Freight Transportation Hub	Freight	IL	Central	\$6,000,000	\$20,789,550	Unspecified
Beartooth Highway Reconstruction Project	Road/Bridge	WY	West	\$6,000,000	\$65,000,000	Unspecified
Millwork District Complete Streets Improvements	Bike/Ped	IA	Central	\$5,600,000	\$6,200,000	Unspecified
Auke Bay Loading Facility	Freight	AK	West	\$3,640,000	\$14,840,000	Unspecified
US-93/2 <sup>nd</sup> Street Improvements	Road/Bridge	MT	West	\$3,500,000	\$3,500,000	Unspecified
Burlington Waterfront North Project	Multimodal	VT	Northeast	\$3,150,000	\$3,915,000	Unspecified

### TIGER II (FY 2010, Does not include TIGER/HUD Planning Grants)

Atlanta Streetcar - Centennial Park to King Center	Transit	GA	South	\$47,667,777	\$72,158,000	Urban
Tower 55 Freight Rail Improvements	Freight	TX	South	\$34,000,000	\$91,200,000	Urban
South Park Bridge Replacement	Road/Bridge	WA	West	\$34,000,000	\$130,700,000	Urban
Sugar House Streetcar - South Salt Lake City	Transit	UT	West	\$26,000,000	\$55,550,000	Urban
Port of Miami Rail Access	Freight	FL	South	\$22,767,000	\$46,907,900	Urban
Crenshaw/LAX Light Rail Connection	Transit	CA	West	\$20,000,000	\$1,715,000,000	Urban
Memorial Bridge Replacement	Road/Bridge	NH, ME	Northeast	\$20,000,000	\$100,000,000	Urban
Route 10 Safety Improvements	Road/Bridge	WV	South	\$17,000,000	\$84,800,000	Rural
Niagara Falls Rail Station	Transit	NY	Northeast	\$16,500,000	\$24,963,400	Urban
Port of Los Angeles: West Basin Railyard	Freight	CA	West	\$16,000,000	\$125,813,000	Urban
New Haven Downtown Crossing and Urban Boulevard	Bike/Ped	CT	Northeast	\$16,000,000	\$31,700,000	Urban
Reconstruct Mitchell-Rapid City Railroad	Freight	SD	Central	\$16,000,000	\$21,000,000	Rural
Razorback Regional Bike/Ped Greenway	Bike/Ped	AR	South	\$15,000,000	\$38,497,618	Urban
Dilworth Plaza and Concourse Improvements	Multimodal	PA	Northeast	\$15,000,000	\$55,000,000	Urban
Minot Grade Separation	Freight	ND	Central	\$14,130,000	\$23,010,000	Rural
Ann Arbor Bridges	Road/Bridge	MI	Central	\$13,900,000	\$23,000,000	Urban
Coos Bay Rail Line	Freight	OR	West	\$13,573,133	\$14,573,133	Rural
Northwest Tennessee Port	Freight	TN	South	\$13,000,000	\$16,000,000	Rural
Steel Point Roadway Improvements	Road/Bridge	CT	Northeast	\$11,159,493	\$44,720,000	Urban
Aroostook Rail Preservation	Freight	ME	Northeast	\$10,546,436	\$29,646,436	Rural
University - Cedar Rapid Transit Station Improvements	Transit	OH	Central	\$10,500,000	\$31,907,783	Urban

Project Name	Mode	State	Region	TIGER Funding	Total Project Cost	Rural/Urban
Port of Providence: Electric Cranes		Freight	RI Northeast	\$10,500,000	\$39,463,976	Urban
Great Plains Freight Rail		Freight	KS, OK Central	\$10,230,597	\$19,858,147	Rural
East Bay Pedestrian and Bicycle Network		Bike/Ped	CA West	\$10,200,000	\$43,300,000	Urban
Meadowlands Adaptive Signal System		Road/Bridge	NJ Northeast	\$10,008,056	\$12,510,070	Urban
San Bernardino Airport Access		Road/Bridge	CA West	\$10,000,000	\$21,800,000	Urban
Parramore Bus Rapid Transit		Transit	FL South	\$10,000,000	\$106,122,377	Urban
Des Moines Multimodal Hub		Multimodal	IA Central	\$10,000,000	\$12,500,000	Urban
Warehouse District Complete Streets Project		Bike/Ped	IL Central	\$10,000,000	\$37,400,000	Urban
Moline Multimodal Station		Multimodal	IL Central	\$10,000,000	\$21,800,000	Urban
Fordham Transit Plaza		Transit	NY Northeast	\$10,000,000	\$19,501,019	Urban
Central Pennsylvania Rail and Road Expansion		Freight	PA Northeast	\$10,000,000	\$52,901,657	Rural
West Vancouver Freight Access		Freight	WA West	\$10,000,000	\$92,855,113	Urban
Port Manatee Marine Highway		Freight	FL South	\$9,000,000	\$32,135,000	Rural
Staples North/South Corridor		Freight	MN Central	\$7,650,000	\$9,850,000	Rural
Freight Rail Reactivation & Rehab		Freight	NE Central	\$4,923,509	\$6,154,386	Rural
Woodside Boulevard Complete Street Initiative		Bike/Ped	ID West	\$3,500,000	\$4,410,000	Rural
Electric Vehicle Corridor (I-5)		Multimodal	OR West	\$2,000,000	\$4,600,000	Rural
Waterloo Rail Station Improvements		Transit	IN Central	\$1,820,100	\$1,820,100	Rural
Moscow Intermodal Transit Center		Multimodal	ID West	\$1,500,000	\$2,815,666	Rural
State University Drive Complete Streets Project		Bike/Ped	GA South	\$1,491,490	\$1,740,000	Rural
East Foster Wells Road Extension		Road/Bridge	WA West	\$1,010,000	\$2,930,000	Rural

**TIGER III (FY 2011)**

State Route 91 Corridor Improvements	Road/Bridge	CA West	\$20,000,000	\$1,347,316,000	Urban
Chicago Blue Line Renewal and City Bike Share	Transit	IL Central	\$20,000,000	\$64,597,200	Urban
St. Louis City Arch River Revitalization	Road/Bridge	MO Central	\$20,000,000	\$99,360,000	Urban
I-95 Hot Lanes	Road/Bridge	VA South	\$20,000,000	\$940,700,000	Urban
South Jersey Port Rail Improvements	Freight	NJ Northeast	\$18,500,000	\$157,550,000	Urban
LYNX Blue Line Capacity Expansion	Transit	NC South	\$18,000,000	\$25,000,000	Urban
Sellwood Bridge Replacement	Road/Bridge	OR West	\$17,700,000	\$268,800,000	Urban
Port of Long Beach Rail Realignment	Freight	CA West	\$17,000,000	\$64,496,013	Urban
Port of New Orleans Rail Yard Improvements	Freight	LA South	\$16,738,246	\$26,132,191	Urban
Buffalo Main Street Revitalization	Road/Bridge	NY Northeast	\$15,000,000	\$40,000,000	Urban
Rutherford Intermodal Facility Expansion	Freight	PA Northeast	\$15,000,000	\$60,500,000	Urban
Westside Multimodal Transit Center	Transit	TX South	\$15,000,000	\$35,000,000	Urban
I-5 Lewis-McChord Area Congestion Mgmt	Road/Bridge	WA West	\$15,000,000	\$34,000,000	Urban
Alton Regional Multimodal Station	Transit	IL Central	\$13,850,000	\$21,980,000	Urban
Saddle Road Improvements	Road/Bridge	HI West	\$13,500,000	\$94,900,000	Rural
Boundary Street Redevelopment	Road/Bridge	SC South	\$12,635,000	\$30,393,700	Rural
Mayfield Transit Station	Transit	OH Central	\$12,503,200	\$15,206,014	Urban
I-95/US-301 Interchange Improvement	Road/Bridge	SC South	\$12,100,000	\$33,400,000	Rural
Prichard Intermodal Facility	Freight	WV South	\$12,000,000	\$35,000,000	Rural

Project Name	Mode	State	Region	TIGER Funding	Total Project Cost	Rural/Urban
Muldraugh Bridges Replacement	Freight	KY	Central	\$11,558,220	\$23,958,194	Rural
Cincinnati Streetcar Riverfront Loop	Transit	OH	Central	\$10,920,000	\$156,290,000	Urban
Kennebec Bridge Replacement	Road/Bridge	ME	Northeast	\$10,810,000	\$24,900,000	Rural
Stamford Intermodal Access	Transit	CT	Northeast	\$10,500,000	\$38,750,000	Urban
IL 83 (147 <sup>th</sup> Street) Reconstruction	Multimodal	IL	Central	\$10,438,000	\$24,657,000	Urban
Dames Point Marine Terminal Intermodal	Freight	FL	South	\$10,000,000	\$45,000,000	Rural
Merrimack River Bridge Rehabilitation	Transit	MA	Northeast	\$10,000,000	\$43,000,000	Urban
Minneapolis Transit Interchange Construction	Transit	MN	Central	\$10,000,000	\$81,200,000	Urban
Devils Lake Rail Improvements	Transit	ND	Central	\$10,000,000	\$99,936,000	Rural
Syracuse Connective Corridor	Multimodal	NY	Northeast	\$10,000,000	\$17,212,476	Urban
IMPACT Philadelphia	Transit	PA	Northeast	\$10,000,000	\$32,000,000	Urban
Carrie Furnace Flyover Bridge	Multimodal	PA	Northeast	\$10,000,000	\$16,000,000	Urban
Caparra Interchange	Road/Bridge	PR	South	\$10,000,000	\$19,000,000	Urban
South Link: Sea-Tac Airport to South 200 <sup>th</sup> St.	Transit	WA	West	\$10,000,000	\$238,402,000	Urban
Northern Montana Multimodal Hub	Freight	MT	West	\$9,998,910	\$17,345,468	Rural
Mississippi River Bridges ITS	Road/Bridge	MS, AR, LA	South	\$9,814,700	\$10,734,450	Rural
17 Mile Road	Road/Bridge	WY	West	\$8,233,700	\$13,233,700	Rural
Oklahoma Freight Rail Upgrade	Freight	OK	South	\$6,756,580	\$8,456,580	Rural
Solomon Rural Rail Upgrade	Freight	KS	Central	\$6,568,095	\$20,108,883	Rural
DART Orange Line Extension	Transit	TX	South	\$5,000,000	\$429,500,000	Urban
Snake Road Improvement	Road/Bridge	FL	South	\$3,700,000	\$4,623,000	Rural
Smiths Creek Road and Bridge Reconstruction	Road/Bridge	MI	Central	\$3,650,000	\$3,850,000	Rural
US 101 Smith River Safety Corridor	Road/Bridge	CA	West	\$2,500,000	\$3,124,800	Rural
City of American Falls Complete Streets	Multimodal	ID	West	\$2,300,000	\$2,850,000	Rural
St. Albans Main Street Reconstruction	Multimodal	VT	Northeast	\$2,088,496	\$2,705,496	Rural
Northfield Multimodal Integration	Bike/Ped	MN	Central	\$1,060,000	\$1,560,000	Rural
St. Michael Community Streets	Road/Bridge	AK	West	\$1,000,000	\$8,568,230	Rural

#### TIGER IV (FY 2012)

I-15 Virgin River Gorge Bridge	Road/Bridge	AZ	West	\$21,600,000	\$27,000,000	Rural
Raleigh Union Station Phase I	Freight	NC	South	\$21,000,000	\$84,240,574	Urban
95 <sup>th</sup> Street Terminal Expansion	Transit	IL	Central	\$20,000,000	\$140,000,000	Urban
Fort Lauderdale Wave Streetcar Project	Transit	FL	South	\$18,000,000	\$83,200,000	Urban
Pickaway East West Connector Road	Road/Bridge	OH	Central	\$16,082,435	\$25,715,481	Rural
Port of Oakland Intermodal Rail Improvements	Freight	CA	West	\$15,000,000	\$43,000,000	Urban
Sacramento Valley Station Improvement	Freight	CA	West	\$15,000,000	\$30,000,000	Urban
I-25 North Managed Lanes Extension and Express Bus Project	Road/Bridge	CO	West	\$15,000,000	\$44,300,000	Urban
Rochester Intermodal Transportation Center	Freight	NY	Northeast	\$15,000,000	\$27,500,000	Urban
East Liberty Transit Center	Transit	PA	Northeast	\$15,000,000	\$34,020,056	Urban
Houston Regional Multimodal Connections to Transit	Bike/Ped	TX	South	\$15,000,000	\$29,889,881	Urban
Main Street to Main Street Multimodal Connector	Multimodal	TN, AR	South	\$14,939,000	\$30,000,000	Urban
Mercer Corridor West Reconstruction	Road/Bridge	WA	West	\$14,000,000	\$98,000,000	Urban

Project Name	Mode	State	Region	TIGER Funding	Total Project Cost	Rural/Urban
Wayne Junction Substation Replacement		Freight	PA Northeast	\$12,862,699	\$25,725,397	Urban
Garrows Bend Intermodal Container Transfer Facility		Freight	AL South	\$12,000,000	\$28,800,000	Urban
Joplin Transportation and Disaster Recovery Projects	Road/Bridge		MO Central	\$12,000,000	\$23,500,000	Urban
Gulf Marine Highway Intermodal Project		Freight	TX South	\$12,000,000	\$26,700,000	Rural
South Hudson Intermodal Facility		Freight	NJ Northeast	\$11,400,000	\$125,000,000	Urban
West Memphis International Rail Port		Freight	AR South	\$10,953,244	\$26,953,244	Rural
Tampa Downtown Multimodal Improvements		Bike/Ped	FL South	\$10,943,100	\$15,633,000	Urban
CREATE		Freight	IL Central	\$10,440,000	\$17,700,000	Urban
Birmingham Roads to Recovery	Road/Bridge		AL South	\$10,000,000	\$30,310,000	Urban
Mission Bay/UCSF Hospital Multimodal Transportation Infrastructure	Multimodal		CA West	\$10,000,000	\$46,500,000	Urban
Hartford's Intermodal Transportation Triangle	Multimodal		CT Northeast	\$10,000,000	\$21,121,000	Urban
Anacostia Bicycle and Ped Project	Bike/Ped		DC, MD Northeast	\$10,000,000	\$15,000,000	Urban
Newark Regional Transportation Center	Freight		DE Northeast	\$10,000,000	\$26,000,000	Urban
Southeast Connector Road Project	Road/Bridge		IA Central	\$10,000,000	\$50,000,000	Urban
Link Detroit Multimodal Enhancements	Multimodal		MI Central	\$10,000,000	\$24,834,173	Urban
Hunts Point Freight Rail Improvement Project	Freight		NY Northeast	\$10,000,000	\$20,602,377	Urban
I-95 Providence Viaduct Project	Road/Bridge		RI Northeast	\$10,000,000	\$169,000,000	Urban
Nueces River Rail Yard Expansion	Freight		TX South	\$10,000,000	\$17,850,000	Urban
North Spokane Corridor Railroad Realignment	Freight		WA West	\$10,000,000	\$31,500,000	Urban
Yellowstone International Airport Interchange Development	Road/Bridge		MT West	\$8,976,224	\$54,316,236	Rural
Northern Vermont Freight Rail Project	Freight		VT Northeast	\$7,912,054	\$11,260,076	Rural
Siskiyou Summit Railroad Revitalization	Freight		OR West	\$7,089,192	\$9,492,256	Rural
Port of Catoosa Main Dock Rehabilitation	Freight		OK South	\$6,425,000	\$12,375,000	Rural
Martin Memorial Bridge Replacement	Road/Bridge		ME Northeast	\$5,202,700	\$8,671,200	Rural
Torreón Road Rehabilitation	Road/Bridge		NM West	\$5,000,000	\$5,740,000	Rural
Coalfields Expressway	Road/Bridge		WV South	\$5,000,000	\$98,000,000	Rural
Ranson-Charles Town Green Corridor Revitalization	Transit		WV South	\$5,000,000	\$23,500,000	Rural
Concord Downtown Complete Streets Project	Road/Bridge		NH Northeast	\$4,710,000	\$7,850,000	Rural
BIA 7 - College Road Improvements	Road/Bridge		ND Central	\$4,000,000	\$9,177,091	Rural
Downtown Clinton Street Improvements	Road/Bridge		IA Central	\$2,700,000	\$14,667,670	Rural
Monroe County Bridge Replacement	Road/Bridge		IN Central	\$1,496,600	\$3,126,250	Rural
Muskegon Rural Bus Service	Transit		MI Central	\$1,350,000	\$1,350,000	Rural
Port of Lewiston Dock Extension	Freight		ID West	\$1,300,000	\$2,900,000	Rural
Ihanktonwan Transit Facilities Project	Transit		SD South	\$1,000,000	\$1,200,000	Rural

Source: USDOT. [www.dot.gov/tiger](http://www.dot.gov/tiger)

# Staff

## Eno Center for Transportation Staff

**Amy Cavaretta**

*2012 Thomas J. O'Bryant Fellow*  
Eno Center for Transportation

**Joshua Schank**

*President and CEO*  
Eno Center for Transportation

**Paul Lewis**

*Policy and Strategic Finance Analyst*  
Eno Center for Transportation

**Pamela Shepherd**

*Senior Director of Communications*  
Eno Center for Transportation

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Eno Center for Transportation  
1250 I Street, NW, Suite 750  
Washington, DC 20005  
[www.enotrans.org](http://www.enotrans.org)